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IntroductIon
Foreign exchange reserve strategies are among the most 
debated issues of modern central banking. Objectives 
behind reserve holdings vary from central bank to central 
bank, typically with little external communication on 
reserve strategies. Moreover, there are no generally 
accepted benchmarks for the required, or optimal, level of 
reserves. The lack of transparency may largely stem from 
the fact that central banks’ primary role is not to achieve a 
certain reserve level, or a specific financing structure, but 
rather the achievement of price stability or other monetary 
policy objectives. Changes in the level of reserves are 
therefore not fully controlled by the central banks; their 
dynamics are influenced both by external factors and by 
influences related to achieving the objectives of monetary 
policy. The diversity of views about the desirable level of 
reserves is reflected by the lack of consensus on a generally 
accepted indicator of foreign reserves to be included in the 
G20’s set of global imbalance indicators, as G20 members 
could not align their diverse opinions (G20 Summit, February 
2011).
A large group of emerging economies, notably in Asia and 
latin America, has accumulated substantial foreign reserves 
over the past two decades. In many cases, the increase in 
reserves far exceeds the levels warranted by the simple 
rules-of-thumb of reserve adequacy. This process has 
sparked a broad debate, also catalysing academic research. 
According to the literature, reserve growth is partly due to 
precautionary motives reflecting deeper financial 
integration, but export-promoting exchange rate policies, 
together with fears of falling behind peers also played a 
role. Overall, however, the intention to fulfil the 
expectations of investors and financial markets increasingly 
dominates reserve accumulation motives.
The global crisis presented a challenge for foreign reserve 
policy in a number of countries, prompting many of them to 
rethink their reserve strategies. For financially integrated 
economies, the sudden disappearance of FX liquidity from 
the banking system presented the biggest threat, while 
capital flight and currency depreciation necessitated FX 
market intervention in other countries. The lessons drawn 
from the crisis suggest that emerging countries with higher 
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levels of reserves are more resilient to external shocks 
overall. This phenomenon was also reflected in the behaviour 
of many emerging countries: following the initial period of 
the crisis, many central banks decided to increase their 
reserves further. Apart from the lessons learned from the 
crisis, reserve accumulation may be driven by numerous 
other factors: monetary mercantilism, quantitative easing 
through foreign currency acquisition, or fears of falling 
behind peers. These factors, coupled with the experience of 
recent years suggest that reserve accumulation may continue. 
Growing reserves in emerging countries could contribute to 
the deepening of global imbalances. At the level of individual 
countries reserve accumulation may appear sensible; 
however, at the global level it is not beneficial, and 
containing it calls for reinforced international coordination.
WHy DO CeNtRAl BANKS HOlD 
FOReiGN exCHANGe ReSeRveS?
Central banks across the world provide various and 
sometimes diverging rationales for their foreign reserve 
holdings. Although the objectives are different, as a general 
tendency meeting the expectations of financial markets has 
increasingly become the focus rather than the classic 
objectives linked primarily to FX market intervention. In 
the following section we briefly present the main objectives 
featured in the communication of various central bank and 
in the academic literature, from the most frequently to the 
most rarely cited ones. 
Meeting the demands of global financial markets/investors 
(the “international collateral” function). Holding foreign 
exchange reserves allows central banks to demonstrate 
their capacity to withstand financial market turmoil. The 
volume of reserves is often used by analysts, foreign 
investors and international financial institutions alike as an 
indicator of a country's resilience to external shocks. Credit 
rating agencies also regard the amount of foreign reserves 
as a vital element of country risk, which thus influences the 
outcome of rating exercises. The international collateral 
role of reserves is particularly important for emerging 
economies, which depend on international capital flows. 
Providing foreign currency liquidity for government 
transactions. In many countries the central bank manages 
the government’s accounts and executes foreign currency 
transactions for public sector entities. This requires a 
certain volume of foreign currency reserve, serving as a 
liquidity buffer for such transactions (“working balance”).
Maintaining fixed exchange rate regimes or target zones. 
For countries with fixed exchange rate regimes or exchange 
rate fluctuation bands, the use of foreign exchange reserves 
supports daily operation, as relatively frequent intervention 
is usually needed to maintain the exchange rate at the 
target. (An example is Denmark.) With wider fluctuation 
bands, large-scale intervention is only required in the event 
of severe FX market turmoil. One of the important 
objectives of holding reserves in these countries is therefore 
to defend the exchange rate regime during times of crisis 
by means of intervention. 
Ensuring adequate capacity for FX market intervention. 
Exceptional shocks affecting the currency can trigger such 
levels of risk and loss for FX market makers that they may 
be pushed to withdraw from providing quotes and trading in 
general. The consequent drying up of FX market liquidity 
and weakening market infrastructure may trigger further 
sharp shifts in the exchange rate. Therefore, even the 
central banks of countries with clean, floating exchange 
rate regimes uphold the possibility of intervention in the FX 
market if warranted by extraordinary market circumstances, 
ensuring the market’s liquidity and continuous operation of 
foreign exchange trading.
What are “foreign exchange reserves”?
A country’s foreign exchange reserves include all 
financial instruments denominated in a foreign currency 
that embody claims on non-residents and are readily 
available to the monetary authority. Foreign exchange 
reserves therefore refer to a portfolio of financial 
assets, from which the monetary authority’s liabilities 
towards foreign entities are not deducted.2,3 
In most cases, foreign exchange reserves are not part of 
the monetary authority’s (country’s) net wealth, as 
they are funded by central bank or government debt. 
The holding of foreign exchange reserves, therefore, 
refers to the maintenance of a characteristically liquid 
gross asset pool financed by debt, which entails 
economic benefits as well as indirect and direct costs.4 
2   The definition is based on the IMF methodology used in the MNB’s statistics. The exact guidelines for the accounting and publication of foreign 
exchange reserves: "International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity − Guidelines for a Data Template", IMF, 2001 
  (http://dsbb.imf.org/Pages/SDDS/SDDSGuide.aspx).
3   Foreign exchange reserves are, in a strict sense, only the foreign currency deposits and bonds held by central banks. However, the term in popular usage 
commonly refers to all international reserves, including gold, SDRs and IMF reserve positions, as well as other reserves including repo receivables. 
4 Misunderstandings related to foreign exchange reserves are usually due to their unilateral use out of context from the central bank balance sheet.MNB BulletiN • April 2011 9
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Financing the balance of payments, providing buffer for 
balance of payments shocks. In countries with no liquid FX 
market, FX demand and supply stemming from external 
trade are covered directly through the central bank’s 
foreign exchange reserves, as is the absorption of any 
inflowing capital. This function is typical of economies in 
early stages of development and of central banks using a 
currency board arrangement. The overwhelming majority 
of emerging economies has sufficiently liquid FX markets 
that fulfil this role without the need for central bank 
intervention or participation. 
Expanding the set of domestic monetary policy instruments. 
In certain markets, the amount of securities available as 
acceptable collateral by the central bank is limited. This is 
usually due to the low supply of government securities in 
countries with low public debt. In these countries, monetary 
policy instruments are sometimes backed by foreign 
currency rather than securities, i.e. the central bank lends 
to commercial banks in the form of FX swaps rather than 
repurchase agreements. Foreign exchange reserves are a 
by-product of monetary policy implementation in such 
cases (Australia, Israel, New Zealand). 
Increasing national wealth, generating revenue. Foreign 
exchange reserves generate revenue for central banks, and 
reserve management should focus on increasing revenue to 
the greatest possible extent, while ensuring the required 
liquidity. The revenue-generating role of foreign exchange 
reserves appears independently in both the international 
literature and the sets of objectives cited by certain central 
banks. However, it cannot be considered a primary 
objective, as the majority of countries do not achieve 
positive returns on their foreign exchange reserves in a net 
sense. The direct costs of holding reserves − financing and 
maintenance costs − generally exceed the yields of the 
reserve portfolio.5
Lender of last resort in foreign currency. A central bank 
may need, in some cases, foreign exchange resources in the 
event of bank crises if it decides to bail out a distressed 
domestic bank based on systemic risk considerations.
Providing ultimate resources for ‘extreme’ global financial 
collapses.  Some authors suggest that the objective of 
holding foreign exchange reserves is to ensure that the 
value of money is preserved in the unlikely event of an 
extreme global financial meltdown. It is obviously very 
difficult to outline such an ‘Armageddon’ scenario, and to 
foresee which instruments would maintain their value if 
such a crisis occurred.
Managing liquidity shortages on the FX swap market. In 
recent years, several central banks have asserted that a 
key additional purpose of reserve accumulation is to 
manage potential FX liquidity shortages on derivatives 
markets. At the onset of the crisis, deteriorating confidence 
triggered the dry-up of FX swap markets, first in developed, 
then in emerging countries. This led to both monetary 
policy dilemmas and financial stability risks in many 
countries with deep financial mutual integration. A number 
of central banks provided FX swap instruments to their 
banking systems to ease the shortage of foreign currency 
liquidity. 
Similarly to other central banks, it is the statutory task 
of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank − as stipulated in the Act 
on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank − to manage the country’s 
foreign exchange reserves. The foreign exchange 
reserves held by the MNB serve various purposes, the 
most important of which include: 
−   to ensure the level of reserves expected by market 
participants (role of “international collateral”);
−   to ensure adequate capacity for interventions;
−   to alleviate foreign currency liquidity problems in the 
event of systemic liquidity crises;
−    to meet transactions-related demand for foreign 
currency (provide the FX liquidity required for the 
foreign currency payment obligations of the 
government).
HOW MuCH ReSeRveS SHOulD ONe 
HOlD?
There is no single best way to determine the optimal level 
of foreign exchange reserves. The benefits and costs of 
holding reserves are very difficult to weigh by way of formal 
economic models, primarily because reserves are generally 
used in bulk only in times of severe crisis. The probability 
of such situations, the unfolding of crises and the benefits 
of using reserves can only be quantified by making 
uncertain, ad hoc assumptions. 
International practice thus tends to define simple rules-of-
thumb for determining the necessary levels of foreign 
5   The situation is different if a country manages its own sovereign wealth as a foreign currency asset fund (e.g. Norway). This generally occurs in oil-
producing countries, where state revenues from oil production are so high that their use in annual budgets is restricted based on economic policy 
considerations, and the accumulating capital is collected and managed in sovereign wealth funds instead.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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exchange reserves to be held by countries. These rules-of-
thumb are incorporated into the recommendations of 
international organisations, the internal practice of central 
banks, and are also used by rating agencies, banks and 
economic analysts to assess the foreign exchange reserve 
levels of countries, and hence their external vulnerability. 
The most common reserve indicators are the following. 
The ratio of foreign exchange reserves to short-term 
external debt (the ‘Guidotti−Greenspan rule’). Following 
the experience of the 1997−98 Asian crisis, short-term 
external debt (debt with remaining maturity of one year or 
less) saw its role increase in determining a benchmark for 
foreign exchange reserves. The significance of short-term 
external debt as an indicator of reserve needs arises from 
financial globalisation. In a financially integrated world 
economy, contrary to past experience, the major external 
risk is not linked to the financing of the current account 
balance deficit, but rather to sudden capital outflows. 
Moreover, empirical research on the Asian crisis suggested 
that the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to short-term 
debt is closely related to the probability and severity of a 
crisis (Edison, 2003).
According to this method, which is commonly referred to as 
the Guidotti−Greenspan rule, foreign exchange reserves 
should equal short-term debt, thereby ensuring sufficient 
liquid assets in the event that a country cannot renew its 
short-term external debt. 
The rule has numerous alternative versions. According to 
some, the optimal level of reserves should also cover the 
current account balance deficit for the current year in 
addition to short-term debt. This corresponds to the 
assumption that no adjustments occur in external balance 
developments despite the funding crisis. Others include 
interest obligations related to external debt when defining 
the benchmark reserve rate, over and above the value of 
short-term external debt. Yet others only include debt 
elements denominated in foreign currency, based on the 
fact that repayment of debt denominated in domestic 
currency does not require foreign currency. 
Guidotti-type rules can be criticised on several grounds. 
For one, the reserve requirement is difficult to gauge, as 
most countries do not publish data on the maturity 
structure of their external debt. Moreover, recent 
experience suggests that short-term debt may accumulate 
rapidly, while central banks often have little room for 
manoeuvre to increase their reserves. Thirdly, the indicator 
does not adequately measure the drying up of external 
funding or the foreign currency needs arising from the 
flight of foreign investors, as the maturity of the assets 
does not necessarily correspond to their liquidity. While 
the indicator does not take certain easy-to-sell debt 
elements into account, it may overestimate the volume of 
capital outflow for other items. For example, in the case of 
loans granted by non-resident owners such as parent banks 
or parent companies, it is hardly plausible that subsidiaries 
with good long-term growth prospects would be cut off 
from intercompany financing, even if it is provided in a 
short-term form. Finally, the indicator ignores the risk of 
capital flight by domestic entities in the event of a banking 
crisis, which could trigger a financing crisis similar to that 
of the drying up of capital inflows. 
Reserve indicators based on gross external debt. Some of the 
above criticisms could be resolved if central banks took total 
external debt into consideration, rather than only short-term 
debt. Such an approach could better mitigate the risk of 
reserves proving insufficient in the event of a sudden 
shortening of maturities. Wyplosz (2007) proposed a similar 
method, arguing that instead of using short-term debt, the 
reserve benchmark should be defined as a percentage of total 
external debt. Wyplosz lists several arguments that support 
the use of total external debt: (1) better availability of data; 
(2) the one-year limit is arbitrary and lacks grounding, as (3) 
long-term debt elements are not necessarily more stable 
compared to short-term ones (during times of crisis, holders of 
long-term instruments can hedge or sell, which can also 
contribute to the depreciation of the exchange rate).
M2-based indicators. According to the M2 rule, reserves 
must cover a given percentage of bank savings with 
maturities of less than two years. The rationale is that M2 is 
a good measure of liquid funding within the banking system, 
and therefore of funding risk that may arise if the confidence 
of domestic deposit-holders deteriorates, as in a banking 
crisis. For this indicator, no generally accepted value exist as 
for the Guidotti rule. Numerous analyses, however, place 
the optimal reserve level within the 5–25 per cent range. 
Green and Torgerson (2007) link the benchmark value to the 
exchange rate regime: countries with floating exchange 
rates should target the lower edge of the range. At the same 
time, market analyses often use peer-group comparisons of 
countries with similar fundamentals, rather than setting a 
specific threshold value.
Much criticism targets this indicator as well. The M2 rule 
only takes risk arising from banking crises into consideration, 
while gauging such risk − the reserve needs stemming from 
the banking crisis and from the outflow of domestic savings 
− imperfectly. The two-year limit is, as in the previous case, 
arbitrary, and unable to capture the amount of potentially 
volatile savings.MNB BulletiN • April 2011 11
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Import rule. The rule states that foreign exchange reserves 
must cover three months of import accounts. The indicator 
primarily attempts to capture risks related to financing the 
current account balance in countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes. The literature agrees that with the 
liberalisation of capital markets the import coverage 
indicator has essentially lost all relevance. Many analysts 
and investors nevertheless still monitor developments using 
this indicator.
The above simple indicators are difficult to justify from a 
theoretical perspective. However, in practice analysts of 
countries’ external vulnerability (international institutions, 
credit rating agencies, market analysts, investment banks) 
place great emphasis on them. Table 1 presents the set of 
indicators used by several investment banks and credit 
rating agencies. It reveals that the M2 and Guidotti rules 
are the most commonly used indicators of foreign exchange 
reserve adequacy. Thus to satisfy the expectations of the 
international investor environment, it is important to 
monitor these indicators, even if the underlying economic 
considerations are not always well-founded. 
The literature on reserves has been increasingly focusing on 
models that, contrary to the above rules-of-thumb, consider 
both the benefits and costs of reserve holdings when 
defining the desirable level of reserves. This phenomenon 
is related in part to the foreign exchange reserve build-up 
after the Asian crisis, and in part to the current crisis. In 
addition, recent years have seen numerous studies published 
examining the motives behind reserve accumulation in an 
international comparison, and setting foreign exchange 
reserve benchmarks by summarising past experience of 
groups of countries using econometric tools (panel 
regression models).
Although far more sophisticated in terms of methodology, 
both the cost-benefit models and the panel regression 
analyses still strongly rely in spirit on the simple rules-of-
thumb analysed to this day by credit rating agencies and 
investment banks. 
Optimising models. Based on the logic of these models, 
foreign exchange reserves can be viewed as a means of 
preventing and hedging against crises, defined as the 
sudden reversal of capital flows. The benefit of holding 
reserves during such crises can be measured using the 
likelihood of the crisis and the output loss suffered in crisis 
years in the absence of reserves, while its cost can be 
captured using a yield difference. Comparison of the 
marginal cost and the benefit determines the optimal level 
of reserves for a given set of circumstances. The 
methodology used is generally based on variants of the 
Jeanne and Rancière (2008) model. 
In the past, such models of optimal reserve holdings have not 
seen much practical use, and served mainly to explain past 
developments in reserves in specific countries or regions. 
Recently published studies, however, often use such models 
to suggest a reserve target for individual countries. Optimising 
models of reserve adequacy are thus no longer confined to 
academic literature. Such approaches are applied, for 
instance, to Chile (Garcia and Soto, 2004), New Zealand 
(Gereben and Woolford, 2005; Gordon, 2005), Uruguay 
(Gonçalves, 2007) and Croatia (Čeh and Krznar, 2008, 2009). 
The main advantage of models assuming optimising 
behaviour is that they explicitly take into account the costs 
and benefits of holding reserves. However, the richer 
framework also presents drawbacks: many of the parameters 
used in the models − such as the likelihood and cost of 
crises, or the degree of risk appetite − cannot be backed by 
robust empirical grounding. The expert judgments used in 
the calibration of the models thus bring a subjective 
element into the outcome. 
Panel data regression models. Another stream in the 
literature attempts to explain observed reserve levels for 
table 1
Rules-of-thumb of foreign reserve adequacy monitored by credit rating agencies and investment banks
import rule M2 rule Guidotti-type rule Gross external debt Gross external 
financing need
Fitch X
Moody's X X X
Standard & Poor's X




Note: Data compiled by the MNB from credit rating agency and investment bank analyses.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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specific country groups using variables assigned to the 
supposedly important motives of reserve accumulation. 
These analyses usually look at the explanatory power of the 
following factors:
(1) size of the economy (GDP per capita, population);
(2)    current account vulnerability (import/GDP, [export+ 
import]/GDP, export volatility);
(3)   capital account vulnerability (financial openness, M2/
GDP, short debt/GDP, proportion of external debt in a 
foreign currency);
(4)   exchange rate flexibility (exchange rate volatility, type 
of exchange rate regime);
(5)   opportunity cost of holding reserves (yield difference). 
According to the theory, the first three groups of indicators 
exert a positive, while the last two groups exert a negative 
effect on reserve levels.
Previous studies (for example Edison, 2003) typically base 
their explanations of reserve levels on the size of the 
economy and the vulnerability of the current account 
balance: besides the size of the economy, the size of and 
fluctuations in foreign trade, and the fluctuations in the 
exchange rate are factors that influence the foreign 
exchange reserve levels of most countries. According to the 
analyses, the costs of holding reserves are only marginally 
taken into account by countries when establishing their 
reserve levels. 
Recent studies (for example Obstfeld et al., 2008) emphasise 
that financial variables, in particular the size of the banking 
system, must also be given a high priority when setting the 
optimal reserve level. They argue that foreign exchange 
reserves must be sufficient for handling a simultaneous 
currency crisis and banking crisis. Moreover, they deem that 
in the event of a crisis, outflow may take place at a faster 
rate from banks' domestic deposits than from external debt 
elements. As short-term external debt matures progressively, 
the effect of not renewing these funds only exerts pressure 
several months later, while in the event of a banking crisis, 
domestic liquid funds may be withdrawn from the country 
in a matter of weeks. The authors therefore consider that 
the M2/GDP indicator (measuring the liquid funding of the 
banking system) plays a fundamental role in the optimal 
reserve level. Their empirical analysis underscores the 
importance of the liquid funding in the banking system in 
explaining past developments in foreign exchange reserves. 
They also demonstrate that the type of exchange rate 
regime, whether fixed or floating, does not influence 
reserve holdings in the countries under review. Central 
banks, however, tend to allocate higher reserves to debt 
denominated in foreign currency as compared to debt 
denominated in domestic currency. 
Panel data regression models suggest suitable reserve levels 
on the basis of past reserve levels observed in peer groups, 
and on motivating factors. The question these models 
answer is how much reserves countries normally hold in 
given circumstances, but do not define any economically 
optimal value. In their analysis, Cheung and Qian (2009) 
attempt to determine the role of examples set by other 
countries in reserve accumulation, the fear of falling behind 
neighbours. The authors use the average reserve levels of 
the countries included in the sample as an explanatory 
variable. According to their findings, fear of falling behind 
competitors − the so-called ‘Keeping up with the Joneses’ 
effect − is significant, and has been an increasingly 
important factor in determining reserve levels since 1997. 
The advantage of this approach is that required reserve 
levels are determined by taking a range of indicators into 
consideration simultaneously. The drawback, however, is 
that it fails to account for the cost of holding reserves, and 
that it defines the “expected”, rather than the economically 
optimal reserve levels. 
In Hungary the Magyar Nemzeti Bank formulates its 
view on the necessary level of reserves using a variety 
of indicators, and considers both the benefits and the 
costs of holding reserves. The Monetary Council 
determines a target value for foreign exchange reserves 
within a band set based on three main indicators (the 
Guidotti rule, a cost-benefit optimising model and the 
indicator incorporating the level of gross debt), taking 
various auxiliary indicators into account.
It is nevertheless important to note that the central 
bank has only limited control over the actual level of 
foreign exchange reserves. The constraints set by the 
liquidity of the currency market leave only a limited 
room for manoeuvre for foreign exchange purchases 
and sales. Foreign currency bond issuances aimed at 
increasing reserves can only be carried out in line with 
public debt management policy. Moreover, the crisis 
has revealed that in times of global financial market 
turbulences the opportunities of reserve accumulation 
become even more limited in each possible market. MNB BulletiN • April 2011 13
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FOReiGN exCHANGe ReSeRve tReNDS 
BeFORe tHe CRiSiS: WHy DiD 
eMeRGiNG COuNtRieS iNCReASe 
tHeiR ReSeRveS?
The past two decades have seen large-scale, rapid increases 
in the foreign exchange reserves of every country. Chart 1 
illustrates that the accumulation of reserves accelerated 
after the Asian crisis and was most prominent in the 
emerging countries most severely hit by the crisis. In 
addition to South-East Asia, the Latin American region 
began to pile up substantial foreign exchange reserves as 
well. In contrast, developed countries show a different 
development: their foreign exchange reserves have only 
increased slightly over the past decades. Foreign exchange 
reserves in emerging economies have in many cases 
reached levels that − as illustrated in Chart 2 − are highly 
excessive, even based on traditional reserve adequacy 
indicators such as the Guidotti rule.6 
In recent years the economic literature on foreign exchange 
reserves has sought to address the issue of the underlying 
reasons and motives behind the surge in reserves. Three 
main reasons have been identified in the literature.
Precautionary motives. This argument claims that the aim 
of increased reserves is to hedge against the vulnerability 
arising from international financial integration and to 
maintain a buffer against the sudden flight of capital 
(Aizenman and Lee, 2007). 
Monetary mercantilism. Increases in reserves are the 
by-product of exchange rate devaluations and of restraining 
exchange rate appreciation through the sale of domestic 
currency by the central bank. It aims at maintaining and 
improving export competitiveness (Aizenman and Lee, 2007).
Fears of falling behind neighbours (‘keeping up with the 
Joneses’). This argument holds that the objective of holding 
reserves is to ensure that reserve indicators do not fall 
behind those of a country’s competitors. This behaviour 
may be motivated by numerous different considerations. It 
can be demonstrated, for instance, that the Asian crisis 
incurred substantially higher costs for countries with lower 
reserves. Higher reserve levels relative to peers can also 
increase capital inflows (Cheung and Qian, 2009). 
Part of the empirical literature explains the dynamics of 
reserve accumulation with variables capturing various 
motives. The prudential motives are generally captured 
using financial openness figures and exchange rate risk 
indicators; mercantilist considerations using exchange rate 
deviations from an equilibrium value (usually purchasing 
power parity) and export growth; and fears of falling behind 
neighbours using the reserve allocation of the region or 
country group under review. Another part of the studies 
Chart 1
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Chart 2
Developments in the Guidotti indicator (reserves to 


























































































































































































































Source: IMF calculations. There may be methodological differences in 
the calculation of the various country indicators. 
6   According to the Guidotti rule, foreign exchange reserves must cover the country’s short-term external debt (foreign exchange reserve adequacy rules 
are discussed later in this article).MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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defines the reserve level justified by the prudential motive 
on the basis of theoretical models, and compares actual 
reserve holdings to the theoretically optimal value. 
The majority of authors conclude that the increases in 
reserve holdings in emerging economies are partially 
(Aizenman and Lee, 2007; Durdu et al., 2007; Jeanne and 
Rancière, 2008; Obstfeld et al., 2008) or entirely (Garcia and 
Soto, 2004; Rodrik, 2006; Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil, 2008) 
spurred by prudential considerations. At the same time, 
certain authors argue in favour of the importance of 
mercantilist considerations (Edison, 2003; Genberg et al., 
2005; Green and Torgerson, 2007; Delatte and Fouquau 2009). 
Increases in competitors’ holdings also exert a significant 
effect on reserve accumulation (Cheung and Qian, 2009).
The main conclusions of the above research are the 
following. 
Although it is not clear whether the upward dynamics of 
reserves observed since the turn of the millennium are 
partially or entirely the result of prudential considerations, 
it can be ascertained that the prudential motive often 
justifies far higher reserve levels than the rules-of-thumb 
(e.g. the Guidotti  rule). Even in the studies arguing that 
export-boosting measures play an important role in 
increasing reserves, the growth spurred solely by prudential 
considerations is higher in most cases than the level 
warranted by traditional indicators.
Efforts to avoid falling behind neighbours and competitors 
had a significant effect on the reserve accumulation of 
Asian countries. This motive only gained ground after the 
Asian crisis. From the perspective of global economy 
welfare, increasing reserves on the grounds of such 
considerations is far from optimal, even if the decision may 
appear sensible at the level of individual countries. 
The literature therefore considers hedging against the 
increase in international capital flows, the deepening of 
financial integration and the resulting risks − the possible 
sudden reversal of capital flows − as the main motor of 
reserve accumulation. At the same time, it remains unclear 
as to the mechanisms through which foreign exchange 
reserves decrease the costs of rapid capital flight.
The classical argument holds that in the event of sudden 
stops, reserves can be used to replenish withdrawn 
capital.
Another possible mechanism is that high reserve levels 
decrease the likelihood of capital flight and the ensuing 
crises in the first place, or, if they do occur, decrease the 
amount of capital outflow. The pertaining empirical findings 
show a mixed picture: certain studies (Bussière and Mulder, 
1999; Garcia and Soto, 2004; Levi-Yeyati, 2008) assert that 
reserves significantly decrease the likelihood of crises, 
while others (Berg et al., 2004; Jeanne and Rancière, 2008) 
argue that the effect is questionable. 
A third potential benefit is that reserve accumulation and 
reserve holdings generally mitigate the entire economy’s 
cost of external financing. According to Levy-Yeyati (2008), 
a one per cent increase in reserves may cut sovereign 
premia by 0.5 per cent. According to Ruiz-Arranz and 
Zavadjil (2008), the effect of reserves on sovereign premia 
is non-linear; their findings reveal that reserves amounting 
to 120-130 per cent of short-term external debt can 
substantially curb sovereign premia.
leSSONS OF tHe CRiSiS: ARe HiGH 
ReSeRveS ReAlly BeNeFiCiAl?
In the post-Lehman period, foreign exchange reserve 
policies, one of the key elements of crisis management 
under real stress, had to prove themselves worldwide. The 
crisis, overarching both geographical and instrument market 
boundaries, and changes in investor expectations spurred 
many countries to rethink their earlier strategies. The main 
lessons drawn from the crisis can be summed up as follows:
Short-term debt forming the basis of the Guidotti rule may 
surge rapidly. One of the main lessons of the crisis has been 
the unexpected and sudden increase in short-term debt. In 
times of turmoil, the terms of financial markets shorten 
significantly, and spreads on long-term funding skyrocket. 
Long-term funding is therefore renewed for far shorter 
maturities, and the new funding is also characterised by 
shorter terms.7 From a central bank perspective, the rapid 
increase in short-term debt can create difficulties for 
reserve adequacy. Statistics are anyhow published with a 
lag of several months. It is particularly difficult for central 
banks to quickly replenish their foreign exchange reserves 
during times of crisis. 
Investors and credit rating agencies expected emerging 
market central banks to comply with the Guidotti rule, even 
at the deepest point of the crisis. Following the onset of the 
crisis, the reserve adequacy of emerging countries became 
7   In Hungary, besides the abovementioned reasons, changes in statistical methodology also contributed largely to the increase in the posted short-term 
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the focus of investor and credit rating agency attention. 
When assessing reserve levels, commentators did not take 
into consideration that decreases in foreign exchange 
reserves are a necessity in such situations. Decreasing 
reserves often go hand in hand with substantial increases in 
risk premia. As a result, many countries chose to see their 
currencies depreciate sharply, rather than tapping into 
their reserves.
Parent bank funding was rolled over even in the most 
critical period of the crisis. The rationale behind the 
Guidotti rule is for reserves to ensure coverage for maturing 
external funding over the span of a year, even if capital 
inflows grind to a halt. At the same time, experience from 
the crisis reinforced one of the criticisms made against the 
Guidotti rule, namely that the rule overstates the extent of 
capital outflow. This is because parent banks and parent 
companies are likely to continue funding their otherwise 
profitable subsidiaries even during the crisis (Banai et al., 
2010). Funds are generally withdrawn only once the firm or 
bank has ample coverage to offset it. The above may 
highlight the fact that the outflow of foreign funds may be 
substantially lower than the volume estimated on the basis 
of maturing external debt. 
In the event of a liquidity crisis, it may be necessary for 
central banks to provide liquidity on the derivative (swap) 
markets, besides spot FX market intervention, which may in 
turn increase the reserve requirement. Prior to the onset of 
the crisis, central banks generally did not foresee that FX 
swaps could also dry up on the spot FX market given liquidity-
boosting intervention, thus calling for central bank intervention. 
In the period following the subprime crisis and especially the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, most developed and emerging 
FX swap markets were affected by USD shortages. The FX 
liquidity shortage emerging in developed countries, in 
conjunction with deteriorating confidence, led to the drying 
up of most FX swap markets worldwide. The crisis highlighted 
the fact that coverage for liquidity provision by the central 
bank to counter the drying up of swap markets must be taken 
into account when sizing foreign exchange reserves.
Besides the classic forms of foreign reserves, alternative 
sources of foreign currency liquidity (swap and repo 
transactions, IMF FCL, etc.) played an important role. The 
central banks of many developed and emerging countries 
received FX liquidity in various forms from the Federal 
Reserve, the ECB or the Swiss National Bank. Mexico, 
Poland and Columbia were granted access to the IMF’s new 
instrument, the Flexible Credit Line. These liquidity-
providing instruments allowed central banks to address the 
foreign currency liquidity shortages on derivate markets 
without using their reserves. When access to such 
instruments was announced, markets reacted very positively 
in most cases, even in countries such as South Korea, Brazil 
or Singapore, where the size of these instruments was 
minor relative to the reserves holdings.8 
In the event of a global crisis, it is often impossible to 
replenish reserves though sovereign bond issuance. One 
option for increasing reserves is to issue foreign currency 
debt. The crisis highlighted the fact that this is often not a 
viable means of replenishing reserves during times of actual 
crisis. Decreasing global risk appetite went hand in hand with 
a drastic slump in demand for the sovereign debt of emerging 
economies; there were no issuances, or if there were, they 
were paired with extremely high premia. In the Central and 
East European region only Poland and Slovakia managed to 
issue sovereign bonds between July 2008 and March 2009, 
albeit only in relatively small volumes (Kiss M. and Mák, 2009). 
At the same time the majority of countries in the region saw 
other channels of external funding dry up as well, forcing 
many of them to borrow from international organisations. 
In Hungary, short-term external debt had already began 
to rise right before the onset of the crisis,9 while 
deteriorating external financing conditions increasingly 
narrowed the options for replenishing reserves. 
Following the onset of the crisis, the FX liquidity 
shortage that emerged in the banking system called for 
rapid central bank intervention. 
Analyses of Hungary continued to reflect investor 
expectations of increasing foreign exchange reserves 
even at the deepest point of the crisis. The repo and 
swap agreement with the ECB and the international 
loan agreement injected the liquidity needed for 
operating central bank instruments, and improved 
confidence vis-à-vis Hungary.
A major positive experience was that the parent bank 
funding forming the lion’s share of short-term debt was 
rolled over even in the most critical period, with even 
more funds flowing in. Past developments do not, 
however, allow general conclusions to be drawn for the 
future.
8   Aizenman and Pasricha (2009) examined the effect of the announcement of the Fed’s swap line extended to Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Singapo-
re on 29 October 2008 on their respective exchange rates. While the exchange rates of emerging countries depreciated by 0.15 per cent on average 
following the announcement, exchange rates in the four beneficiary countries appreciated by an average of 4 per cent.
9   Changes in statistical methodology also played a role in the rapid rise of short-term external debt. Some of the changes in methodology and revisions 
increased the debt dynamics of short-term external debt during the critical period, while others retroactively caused significant increases in data levels.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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tHe eFFeCtS OF tHe CRiSiS ON 
NAtiONAl ReSeRve StRAteGieS
The lessons drawn from the crisis have led many countries 
to rethink their strategies about foreign exchange reserves. 
Central banks in several developed countries substantially 
altered their picture of optimal reserve levels (e.g. Australia, 
Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand), and the level of liquid 
reserves that can be tapped into in times of crisis also 
increased thanks to the FX swap lines and other credit line 
agreements offered by the major central banks issuing 
reserve currencies. At the same time, many emerging 
countries (e.g. Israel, South Korea and Mexico) expressed 
their intention to increase reserves. 
Denmark already had high reserves in comparison to 
developed European countries even before the onset of the 
crisis. This may primarily stem from the country’s 
commitment to low exchange rate volatility, which 
warranted the reinforcement of its intervention capacity. 
External resources play a key role in the financing of the 
Danish banking system. The drying up of external funding 
during the crisis led to the unavoidable increase of the role 
of FX liquidity provision and FX funding by the central bank. 
The Danish central bank started building up substantial 
reserves, seeing the previous level double by mid-2009.
In Sweden, reserve levels were dipped into by the FX 
liquidity instruments directly extended to the banking 
system on the one hand, and by those indirectly extended 
to the countries where Swedish subsidiary banks operated 
(Estonia, Latvia and Iceland). The Swedish debt management 
agency issued FX bonds amounting to USD 13 billion in order 
to replenish reserves and the central bank contracted a 
further EUR 3 billion loan from the ECB. Moreover, Sweden 
concluded FX swap agreements with the ECB and the 
Federal Reserve. 
Israel, choosing to abstain from the reserve accumulation 
competition in the past, decided to ramp up its reserve 
levels early on in the crisis. Prior to the crisis, Israel had low 
reserve levels, both in an absolute sense and in comparison 
with other emerging economies. Israel experienced 
significant capital inflows during the crisis thanks to its 
relatively favourable macroeconomic prospects, leading to 
an appreciation of its currency. Reserves were primarily 
increased through daily interventions of equal amounts.
Due to the reserve accumulation over the past decades, the 
majority of Asian and Latin American emerging economies 
had greater leeway for managing the crisis than in previous 
sudden steps. While in the past, the lack of sufficient 
intervention capacity left few short-term adaptation options 
besides currency depreciation, one of the main current crisis 
management measures has been the utilisation of reserves in 
certain countries. Russia used up nearly 30 per cent of its 
foreign reserves, while South Korea used up over 20 per cent 
to buffer the short-term impacts of the crisis (Chart 3).
The events have also made their mark on the debate about 
the optimal or excessive size of reserves. In its analysis 
Standard and Poor’s (2008) states that while one year prior 
to the crisis many thought that the accumulation of 
reserves in Asia was excessive and contributed to global 
imbalances, the experience of the crisis proved otherwise. 
In their study published prior to the crisis, Park and Estrada 
argue against the holding of substantial reserves, while the 
revised version of the study published in 2009 (Park and 
Estrada, 2009) concludes that South Korea’s experiences in 
2008 question the previously established findings. 
Aizenman and Sun (2009) provide a thorough study of 
emerging market reserves during the crisis. Their findings 
reveal that half of the emerging countries used reserves to 
accommodate the effects of the crisis. A sharp decrease of 
reserves mainly manifested itself in primary goods exporting 
countries, while countries presumably holding high foreign 
reserves due to financial openness and integration used up 
their reserves in a much smaller scale, if at all. The 
majority of countries only used up one quarter of their 
reserves during the crisis, while the average exchange rate 
depreciation in the sample was around 30 per cent between 
August 2008 and February 2009. The authors conclude that 
using reserves may be more costly for financially integrated 
emerging countries than exchange rate depreciation.
Chart 3
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Fear of losing reserves may be motivated by several factors. 
Firstly, decreasing reserves may trigger speculative attacks, 
and secondly, it may increase the costs of external 
financing, thereby pushing up the overall costs of the crisis. 
These impacts may be exacerbated by any lagging behind 
the peer group countries. 
Following the early stages of the crisis, reserve accumulation 
regained momentum in a broad group of emerging countries. 
Mexico and South Korea both announced plans to increase 
their reserves. Mexico first concluded an FX swap agreement 
with the Federal Reserve, and the USD 47 billion credit line 
it received from the IMF increased its potential level of 
foreign exchange reserves. As of 2010, the central bank 
aims to ensure funds for long-term reserve accumulation by 
issuing FX options. South Korea's reserves were presumably 
once again built up to historical levels by FX swap lines and 
FX purchases made by the central bank. 
Besides the fear of falling behind neighbours and compliance 
with the expectations of investors, an additional motive 
may have spurred reserve accumulation during the crisis: 
besides “classic” mercantilist considerations, intervention 
by selling one’s own currency is a convenient method of 
quantitative monetary easing in small, open economies. In 
countries where interest rate policy approaches the lower 
bound, intervention prompting depreciation may be a good 
method for boosting the economy with monetary measures; 
this may lead to further increases in reserve levels. 
The level of foreign exchange reserves in Hungary at 
the end of 2010 approached EUR 34 billion, which is 
nearly double the pre-crisis volume. Increases in foreign 
reserves overall exceeded the growth in debt indicators 
reflecting various vulnerabilities stemming from the 
crisis, thereby contributing to making the country more 
resilient to external shocks.
CONCluSiONS − tHe NeeD FOR 
iNteRNAtiONAl COORDiNAtiON AND 
MACROPRuDeNtiAl ReGulAtiON
The lessons of the crisis and foreign exchange reserves that 
continue to swell even during times of crisis suggest further 
accumulation in global reserves. This increase in reserves is 
motivated by many factors. Countries with higher reserves 
proved more resilient in the crisis. Besides monetary 
mercantilism, quantitative easing through foreign exchange 
intervention may gain an increasing role in the long run. 
Increases in reserve holdings may exacerbate fears of falling 
behind neighbours, similarly to the events seen after the 
Asian crisis. 
Further growth in reserves may see the race to pile up 
reserves among emerging countries lead to an imbalance; 
the scurry may seem rational on the level of individual 
countries, but is detrimental on a general scale. 
Maintaining high reserve levels usually comes with 
significant explicit and implicit costs. Central banks 
generally invest foreign exchange reserves in safe and 
liquid, that is low-yielding instruments. Because financing 
is generally more costly than the return realised on the 
reserves, increasing reserves dampens central bank profit 
and incurs fiscal costs. Besides these direct costs, there 
are also certain indirect costs: reserve accumulation 
channels domestic savings and capital inflow into foreign 
instruments, thereby withdrawing them from private 
investments (crowding-out effect). The experience of 
certain countries also reveals that increasing reserve 
levels also attracts short-term, destabilizing capital flows 
through moral hazard. Increases in the reserves held by 
emerging countries also generate continuous capital flows 
towards developed countries, further deepening the 
global imbalances. A continuation of the increase of the 
savings gap between developed and emerging countries 
could pose a threat to global financial stability and may 
easily trigger future financial turbulence. 
International coordination would be necessary in order to 
arrive at a solution that is optimal for both individual 
countries and the world. A good solution would be the 
creation of an alternative system of FX liquidity and 
financing instruments that could be used to increase 
reserves; these played a vital role in managing the crisis. 
Such solutions include the swap facilities between emerging 
and developed countries introduced during the crisis or the 
IMF’s new Flexible Credit Line instrument, which enable 
emerging countries to access FX liquidity in the event of a 
sudden stop, without depleting their reserves. Reserve 
pools represent a similar concept; the Chiang Mai initiative 
created amongst Asian countries is an example thereof.10 
At the same time, it is clear that regional and bilateral 
agreements only present a partial solution. Swap lines 
provided by developed countries were primarily motivated 
by the risks stemming from the indirect exposure of the 
10   The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) is an arrangement concluded in 2000 between South-East Asian countries (ASEAN) and Japan, China and South Korea, 
in the context of which participants concluded bilateral swap agreements. Participating countries can also use each other’s reserves within certain 
limits in order to manage FX liquidity problems. The agreement was prompted by the lessons learned from the 1997 crisis and the negative 
experiences with IMF programmes. In the course of 2008−2009, there was no such usage in the framework of the CMI.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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banking systems of parent countries. Such agreements 
would not have been established if the banking systems of 
the countries providing the swap instruments had themselves 
not been facing difficulties, and had an interest in mitigating 
the problems of the foreign exposures of their banking 
systems. It is uncertain whether such assistance would be 
offered in the event of regional or localised crises. The 
issue of moral hazard also arose in relation to long-term 
swap agreements.11
Regional swap agreements (reserve pools) could come 
under pressure if an entire region were affected by a crisis, 
and every member of the reserve pool would need foreign 
exchange reserves. For these reasons, bilaterally and 
regionally provided instruments can only substitute reserve 
holdings to a small extent. 
The FX swap instruments and credit lines provided by 
international financial institutions could, at the same time, 
become a permanent feature of the international financial 
system. The instruments created by the IMF − such as the 
FCL, open to countries with better fundamentals and 
sounder economic policy pasts, or the PCL, open to those 
with weaker performances − could manage systemic risks. 
For these instruments to curb excessive reserve 
accumulation, however, the stigma, whether real or 
imaginary, felt by countries must be eradicated. 
Besides the development of an “international financial 
safety net”, the other main concept for limiting reserve 
build-up could be the establishment of macroprudential 
regulation aiding the reduction of reserve requirements. 
The broad experience of CEE countries has been that the 
maturity of banks’ external, generally FX-denominated 
funds shortened sharply during the crisis. This decrease in 
duration represents a risk for financial stability, as maturity 
mismatch deteriorated significantly on banks’ balance 
sheets. In particular, the maturity mismatch of assets and 
liabilities per currency increased, which could engender 
problems for ensuring FX liquidity and closing open balance 
sheet FX positions in the event of the drying up of derivative 
markets. The above risks could be managed by creating a 
regulation limiting the shortening of the maturity of bank’s 
external funds, also restraining increases in short-term 
external debt and the foreign exchange reserve requirement.
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